Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review
Volume 18
Issue 2 Spring

Article 6

3-2017

Healthism, Intersectionality, and Health Insurance: The
Compounded Problems of Healthist Discrimination

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/benefits
Part of the Disability Law Commons, Elder Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy
Commons
Recommended Citation
Jacqueline R. Fox, Healthism, Intersectionality, and Health Insurance: The Compounded Problems of Healthist Discrimination, 18 Marq.
Benefits & Soc. Welfare L. Rev. 279 (2017).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Benefits and Social Welfare Law Review by an authorized editor of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

FOXFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

10/28/17 7:16 PM

HEALTHISM, INTERSECTIONALITY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE: THE COMPOUNDED
PROBLEMS OF HEALTHIST DISCRIMINATION
Jacqueline R. Fox*
Healthism can identify situations where a person is subject
to a particular form of bigotry based on their individual health
status. In health insurance, some forms of healthism are
unavoidable due to the very nature of health insurance
structures.
However, when analyzing health insurance
programs, particularly those that are funded through
government, it is possible to utilize a healthism framework to,
first, recognize and minimize the worst effects of outright bigotry
and, second, minimize and potentially ameliorate the worst
effects of healthism combined with intersectionality. This Essay
analyzes these issue as they relate to health insurance,
Medicare, and the potential role of the Independent Payment
Advisory Board.

* Jacqueline R. Fox, J.D., LL.M, is an associate professor of health law and
bioethics at the University of South Carolina School of Law. Fox received her J.D.
and LL.M at Georgetown University Law Center and was post-doctoral Greenwall
Fellow in health policy and bioethics and a Yale University Donaghue Visiting
Scholar of Research Ethics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay takes an initial look at health insurance, and
then examines Medicare’s Independent Payment Advisory Board
by utilizing the framework developed by Jessica L. Roberts and
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard in their forthcoming book, Healthism:
Health Status Discrimination & the Law.1 The book defines a
form of prejudice called “healthism” and lists factors used to
determine whether healthism is present in a particular
situation. These factors consider whether a behavior or activity
is: (1) driven by animus; (2) unfairly stigmatizing; (3)
punishment for private conduct; (4) an impediment to accessing
health care; (5) a complete barrier to accessing health care; (6)
producing worse healthcare outcomes; and (7) maintaining or
increasing current disparities.2 Currently, health insurance in
the United States presents significant problems with a majority
of these factors. The Medicare program, enacted to directly
address the elderly population’s struggle to access health
insurance, demonstrates more subtle healthism challenges than
the private insurance marketplace, but both models highlight
ongoing issues in the very design of a third-party payer system.
During the 2016 election, President Trump and the
Congressional majority promised significant changes to the
current healthcare system, raising the potential for a large
disruption to this system in the near future.3 Given this
possibility, the country should consider the healthism factors
when discussing the social justice implications of the current
system and possible reform efforts.
The ramifications of healthism are significant, but the
problem is compounded when healthism is combined with
1. JESSICA ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS LEONARD, HEALTHISM: HEALTH
STATUS DISCRIMINATION & THE LAW (Cambridge U. Press, forthcoming 2017).
2. Jessica Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (and Isn’t) Healthism?,
50 GA. L. REV. 833, 895 (2016).
3. Alison Kodjak, Trump Can Kill Obamacare With Or Without Help From
Congress, NPR (Nov. 9, 2016, 7:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2016/11/09/501203831/trump-can-kill-obamacare-with-or-without-help-fromcongress [https://perma.cc/4XWG-UW6P].
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intersectionality.
First, health insurance healthism can
exacerbate disparate treatment due to race, gender, disability
status, gender identity, and body norms, which adds a layer of
injustice and burden. Second, when healthism is combined with
animus, bigotry, or unconscious bias, it can influence insurance
plan design, coverage decisions, or the promulgation of
governmental regulations in the health care realm, which
further exacerbates and entrenches these problems.
II. HEALTH INSURANCE
By definition, a private marketplace for health insurance
has qualities that prejudice people based on their individual
health status. Health insurance, in its purest form, is a product
that healthy people buy in case they become sick or are injured,
much like a homeowner purchasing fire insurance. As with fire
insurance, each member pays money into a pool of funds that is
used to cover any costs the members have if an insured event
occurs. Similarly, the insurance company calculates, in advance,
the amount of money that must be in the pool by determining
the likelihood of any particular illness or injury occurring in the
covered population, and how much it will cost to provide care for
that illness or injury. Individuals purchasing insurance, by
contributing to this pool, agree to cross-subsidize each other if
these events occur. This works because it is impossible to
identify who will suffer an illness or injury, but those individuals
recognize that a proportion of a given population is likely to
suffer from an illness or injury.
Consistent with this concept of insurance, health insurers
developed methods to identify and exclude people who did not
have a perfect health status because the model, as described
above, does not anticipate paying for known and fixed upfront
costs. For example, if an insurer knows an applicant’s illness
will cost $20,000 to treat, a realistic price for participation in an
insurance plan would be $20,000 plus the risk of generating any
additional costs. Any other outcome results in existing plan
members subsidizing health care needs that were generated
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prior to entering into an agreement to cross-subsidize newly
emerging and unpredictable health care needs. Before a health
insurance plan is sold, the marketers must determine the likely
cost of providing care so the pool has sufficient funds to cover
care, and the beneficiaries of the pool are charged the correct
amount. To do this, the marketers examine attributes of the
population likely to be covered and predict how much it will cost
to provide that population with the care that is promised in the
insurance contract. Within these calculations, a plan can use a
community rating, which assesses the health care costs for a
swath of a population, for example, adults in Cincinnati who
seek private insurance. A plan could also choose to only offer
insurance to individuals whose personal risk of developing an
illness is low. This is accomplished through underwriting, a
process where an applicant is required to fill out a questionnaire
from the insurance company asking for specific information
related to their health status. The company then declines to sell
that applicant insurance if the risks of future costs presented by
their individual health status appear too great. The individual
underwriting process allows the plan to set a lower price for each
individual who is covered because the members allowed into the
pool are healthier to begin with. A plan may also offer insurance
to someone, but specifically exclude payments for any health
care costs related to an existing condition. Most plans use a
combination of these methods to calculate cost and determine
whether to cover a new member and whether to include specific
exclusions by blending qualities of a community with specific
details about the health status of an individual.
In such insurance plans, even if a plan selects new members
using strict criteria, new members generally have an
introductory time frame where they are covered by a plan but
are not covered for pre-existing conditions. For example, new
members may not have medical care paid for if it is related to a
symptom that predates the plan’s start date.
The effect of this system is to identify and exclude people
solely based on pre-existing health problems, which is a perfect
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example of healthism. The effect of this exclusion of people
based on pre-existing conditions, in turn, is to impede, and
perhaps entirely foreclose access to, health care (due to
prohibitive cost), which produces measurably worse health
outcomes.
There are numerous federal and state laws and regulations
that seek to alter this marketplace; and due in large part to
these changes, current health insurance bears little resemblance
to a pure form of insurance. For example, the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) was
enacted in 19864 and requires, in pertinent part, that employers
who provide health insurance to their employees must give
employees who leave their jobs the option to continue being
insured under the company’s plan for a specified period of time.
This does not fix the problems with gaining access to individual
insurance, but delays when the problems occur. This law
reduces some effects of healthism by allowing a person with a
health issue to have continuous access to health care during the
covered time. However, the requirement that the patient pay
the cost of the insurance is difficult for people who are sick and
unable to work.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
19965 (HIPAA) requires, in pertinent part, private insurance
companies to allow new members to use time during which they
had health insurance from an immediately prior group
insurance plan to avoid a delay in accessing coverage for care in
the new plan, eliminating any bar to coverage for pre-existing
conditions. This greatly reduces problems related to accessing
care, but only benefits employees who participated in an
employer-sponsored insurance plan and leaves individuals who
do not have access to employer-sponsored insurance unprotected
4. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, title
I, § 601, as added Pub. L. 99–272, title X, § 10002(a), Apr. 7, 1986, 100 Stat. 227;
amended Pub. L. 101–239, title VII, §§ 7862(c)(1)(B), 7891(a)(1), Dec. 19, 1989, 103
Stat. 2432, 2445.
5. Pub. L. 104–191, August 21, 1996, 110 Stat 1936.
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and at risk.
Intersectionality is particularly useful in
pinpointing flaws in this law. A study conducted in 1997, a year
after HIPAA was first passed, found that while 64% of the
overall workforce had employer-sponsored health insurance,
there were measurable disparities across different races.6 For
white non-Hispanics, 69% had employer coverage.7 For blacks
and Hispanics, respectively, the numbers were 52% and 44%,8
meaning that the protection offered by HIPAA gave a
disproportionate positive effect to whites overall.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act9 (ACA),
enacted in 2010, has a number of provisions controlling the
marketplace. For example, people may only purchase insurance
that is subject to the enrollment protections of the ACA during
an open enrollment season or due to a delineated life event, such
as giving birth.10 This creates a limited window in which to
purchase insurance if an individual becomes sick, thus
protecting the functionality of the marketplace as described
above. Within the open enrollment time frame, insurance
companies may not refuse to issue policies due to the health
status of the potential member,11 but they may charge a specific
range of higher rates because of a member’s age,12 location of
residency,13 or tobacco use,14 all of which can be used as rough
6. Allyson G. Hall, Karen Scott Collins & Sherry Glied, Employer-Sponsored
Health Insurance: Implications for Minority Workers, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1,
2, 5 (1999), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Hall_employer-sponsored.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3KS-68DQ] [hereinafter 2015 Highlights].
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id.
9. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012).
10. Health Insurance Reform Requirements for the Group and Individual
Health Insurance Markets. 45 C.F.R. pt. 147 (2014).
11. 45 C.F.R. § 147.104, 147.106, 147.108 (2014).
12. 45 C.F.R. § 147.102(a)(1)(iii) (2014). Insurance companies may charge older
adults higher premiums than younger adults, limited to three times what they
charge younger adults.
13. 45 C.F.R. § 147.102(b) (2014). Insurance companies are allowed to charge
more to those who live in areas where medical costs are high because of the
geographic location.
14. 45 C.F.R. § 147.102(a)(1)(iv) (2014). Insurance companies may charge
tobacco users up to 1.5 times what they charge those who do not use tobacco
products.
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estimates of the potential cost to insure. Again, these reforms,
while helpful, continue to demonstrate healthism.
First, by limiting enrollment to a specific season, uninsured
individuals who become sick or injured outside of the season
cannot purchase insurance. Since health care is simply too
expensive for most people to self-fund, the enrollment period
prevents some individuals from accessing health care when they
most need it. Second, allowing insurers to charge higher
premiums due to age is a placeholder for the higher health care
costs associated with increased age,15 thus allowing a less direct
but still healthist cost burden. Finally, allowing an increased
charge for those who use tobacco products both stigmatizes and
punishes people who choose to privately consume these legal
products. Accordingly, this charge could make it less likely they
will purchase insurance due to the increased cost, which then
leads to impeded access and worse outcomes for a population
that is known to be at a higher risk for poor health.16
As it is currently defined, health insurance bears little
resemblance to classic insurance, not only due to regulations,
such as those discussed above, but also due to the massive
changes in health care and populations since the middle of the
20th century, when the earlier model of health insurance was
prevalent. Today, more money is spent on health care, more can
be done to help people, and the types of problems people are
living with have changed dramatically.17 Currently, health care
in the United States is extremely expensive, costing roughly

15. Id.
16. Alex C. Liber et al., Tobacco Surcharges on 2015 Health Insurance Plans
Sold in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces: Variations by Age and Geography and
Implications for Health Equity, 105 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH S696, S696-98 (2015).
(“[T]obacco users tend to have lower income and employment, and the current
dynamic will ensure that these individuals will be further financially burdened by
the tobacco surcharge, even to the point that insurance through the health insurance
exchange remains unaffordable even after subsidization. Little systematic evidence
has been collected on the effect of tobacco surcharges on consumer behavior or health
outcomes.”).
17. See Joseph L. Dieleman et al., US Spending on Personal Health Care and
Public Health, 1996-2013, 316 JAMA 2627 (2016).
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$10,000 per person per year.18
Given the numerous
19
recommendations for preventive care, some of these expenses
are for care that non-symptomatic people receive to identify and
treat previously unknown problems at an early stage before a
discovered condition becomes more severe, which means that
even if one were to limit insurance purchasing to healthy people,
it will still carry the fixed costs of preventive care. Furthermore,
a large percentage of Americans have chronic conditions that can
be treated and controlled, but not healed.20 Allocating the cost of
managing and treating these conditions is a pervasive feature of
any current payment system.
In light of preventive care, the high number of people with
chronic conditions, and the overwhelming proportion of people
who utilize the healthcare system, a model of insurance where a
member is healthy at enrollment and presents a limited risk of
incurring any covered costs is no longer useful for a system that
is meant to cover most Americans. It is likely, and probably
preferable, that all members will have health care expenses over
time and many of them will have expensive chronic care needs.
People become increasingly complex insurance risks over time
and, over the course of a lifetime, will most likely find it difficult,
if not impossible, to access health care within a traditional
insurance marketplace.
The inherent conflict between the historic financial basis for
insurance and the current health care needs of the insured

18. This data is as of 2015, see National Health Expenditures 2015 Highlights,
CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV. (2015), https://www.cms.gov/researchstatistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata
/downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7C2-LEQ2].
19. For a list of recommendations made by the United States Preventive
Services Task Force, see Published Recommendations, U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERV.
TASK FORCE (2017), https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/BrowseRec/
Index/browse-recommendations [https://perma.cc/6DBT-M3UQ]. There are currently
ninety-eight separate recommendations. Id.
20. According to data collected by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC),
roughly half of American adults have a chronic condition. Chronic Diseases: The
Leading Causes of Death and Disability in the United States, CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/overview/
[https://perma.cc/P3T6-7S73].
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population leads to a system where healthism is present, but
increasingly opaque. Third-party payers still have incentives to
use people’s health status as a reason to treat them differently,
but have limited means to do so transparently. It is a poor
model for a system if one seeks to provide care without
healthism influencing access and treatment.
To understand the risk of a more opaque form of healthism,
one must realize that the financial stakes are high and
information is asymmetrical. Third-party payers, including
private and governmental insurers, pay a significant share of
health care expenses, roughly 89% overall.21 In this high-stakes
atmosphere, insurance consumers are at a disadvantage. The
process of pricing health insurance is exceedingly complex, and
such complexities of the health needs of the population continue
to make it increasingly so. Within that complexity, however, it
is relatively simple for actuarial science to predict the costs a
specific person is likely to incur for health care in a given year.
Even in this current system, with some limitations on insurance
company behavior and an understanding that most people
present some risk of cost, a sophisticated approach assessing a
potential member’s health status and dissuading that person
from either joining a plan or utilizing care, can have important
financial implications. The consumer, not realizing their health
status can be assessed and this assessment can change how an
insurer relates to them, is thus vulnerable.
III. THE INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD
The ACA creates the Independent Payment Advisory
Board22 (IPAB), which acts as a mechanism for controlling costs
of the Medicare program. Medicare currently provides insurance
to people over the age of 65 and those with disabilities.23 IPAB

21. 2015 Highlights, supra note 18, at 2.
22. See Independent Payment Advisory Board, 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk (2012).
23. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act is administered by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395-1395ccc (2012). Regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services
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has two primary responsibilities related to Medicare. First, if
Medicare costs per capita are projected to increase a significant
amount in the future, IPAB puts together a package of
recommendations that will reduce these costs to an acceptable
level.24 The content of the package is subject to significant
limitations, such as proposals within it cannot reduce “access”25
and cannot cut any care that is already covered by the Medicare
program.26 Many commentators originally envisioned IPAB to
focus entirely on reducing the payments that Medicare makes to
physicians for specific types of care.27
However, access
considerations make it unlikely that any significant reductions
can occur in this manner because it would reduce the number of
physicians who provide services.28 Additionally, because IPAB
cannot cut types of care that are currently covered, it must, by
necessity, focus its efforts on identifying and limiting coverage
for new medical care, drugs, and devices that are not currently
covered.29
If IPAB proposes a package and Congress does not respond,
it becomes law.30 If Congress opens the package up for debate
and alters any aspect of it so that the cost reduction is lessened,
Congress must then explicitly fund the increase through the

relating to Title XVIII are contained in 42 C.F.R. pt. 430-485 (2014).
24. See Independent Payment Advisory Board, 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk (2012) (“. . .
while maintaining or enhancing beneficiary access to quality care under this
subchapter.”).
25. Id.
26. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(II) (2012) (“The proposal shall not include
any recommendation to ration health care, raise revenues or Medicare beneficiary
premiums under section 1395i–2, 1395i–2a, or 1395r of this title, increase Medicare
beneficiary cost-sharing (including deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments), or
otherwise restrict benefits or modify eligibility criteria.”).
27. For a full discussion of this statute, see Jacqueline Fox, Death Panels: A
Defense of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 132
(2014).
28. Id.
29. It may be possible for IPAB to consider new uses of previously covered care,
drugs, or devices. This would be a fair reading of the statute, but is not specifically
expressed.
30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395kkk(e)(1), (3) (2012).
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budget.31 Once the package is opened, Congress can alter it, as
well as Medicare more generally, in any manner.
IPAB has not yet been created, as the Medicare program
has not projected increased costs sufficient to trigger it. Once it
is created, it must, in addition to creating a package, issue
annual reports that recommend methods for reducing costs
across the entire health care system in the United States, which
is its second major responsibility.32 These reports are not bound
by the same limitations the package is subject to and, thus, can
presumably cover anything. Of particular interest here, given
the package focus is likely to be on future developments in
health care and there is a lengthy process by which new
developments are studied and receive federal marketing
approval, the annual report could include early stage
recommendations to those developing new technologies as to how
IPAB wishes them to constrain future costs.
Accordingly, there are three distinct areas within the IPAB
scheme that have risks regarding healthism. These areas
include the package, Congressional action on the package, and
the annual reports.
Despite there being three primary risks of healthism within
IPAB’s structure, concrete measures can be taken to reduce
these risks. First, any decision regarding coverage that is based
on statistical data will most likely create winners and losers
based on health status, given that the data is imperfect. Second,
if any type of care is excluded, it will have a disproportionately
worse effect on those who already suffer from the social
determinants of health, as they will have fewer personal
resources to ensure access in a private market. Third, outright
animus or unconscious bias can fuel a package of
recommendations or a subsequent Congressional debate, as
some people may be perceived as being less worthy of protection

31. See id. § 1395kkk(d)(3) (2012).
32. Id.
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or provision of health care, particularly when scarce resources
are being allocated.
Program-based cost controls, which are proposals for what
exactly will be covered or excluded across the program, rely on
data regarding the effectiveness of a particular intervention.
This type of decision could have healthist implications. For
example, a payer is considering two antibiotics, A and B, for a
particular bacterial infection that exhibits specific symptoms,
but is not usually diagnosed with a test to identify the specific
bacteria strain. Antibiotic A works in 80% of the people and
antibiotic B works in 20%. If antibiotic A is covered and
antibiotic B is not, or if antibiotic A is the first line of treatment
and antibiotic B is the second, some statistical group will likely
be harmed by this choice because some people may only respond
to antibiotic B and not antibiotic A. At least arguably, those
with a bacterial infection who only respond to antibiotic B will
suffer harm from this decision due to their health status.
As another example, consider a procedure that costs $100 to
provide and is effective in 50% of patients who receive it. For
every 1,000 patients (providing the numbers hold across that
population), 500 of them will be cured, costing $200 per cure.
The procedure will directly waste $50,000 for every 1,000
patients, and 500 of them will be exposed to potential risks from
the procedure while receiving no benefit.
Both of these examples demonstrate that it is imperative,
from a healthism perspective, to consistently generate reliable
data about effectiveness and make increasingly accurate
assessments about the best care for individuals. Populationbased assessments make sense when allocating scarce resources,
and this argument is not meant to challenge that approach.
Rather, an acknowledgment of the healthist effects of such a
decision require that it be implemented with an eye towards
continual refinement to alleviate future harms that spring from
health status. Furthermore, given that one can statistically
pinpoint an area of waste, as in the second example, and waste
in one area causes resources to be unavailable for the treatment
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of other patients, a healthism framework advocates for a system
that continually searches for a better and more accurate patient
population for any procedure.
When a particular form of care is beneficial and still
excluded from coverage, the burden of providing that care is
shifted to the patient. By applying an intersectionality analysis,
this burden, based initially on health status, may become
significantly more burdensome to those who are members of an
otherwise marginalized group.
Medicare and other third-party payers continually struggle
with the level of illness that a patient must suffer to justify
covering an admission to a hospital or continuing to keep a
patient in the hospital. In theory, many sick people can be cared
for at home. Doing otherwise wastes scarce resources, such as
money and hospital beds, and perhaps, unnecessarily disrupts
patients’ lives.
However, for those who have insufficient
resources for home care, a decision to not admit or discharge
them heightens the risk of many factors of healthism. People
who do not have a home simply cannot receive home-based care.
Medical instructions requiring a caretaker are burdensome for
those who do not have a person to help them throughout the
time frame when they need assistance. It may be difficult or
impossible to purchase the medical aids, special foods, or
medicines that are required for those of limited means.
Additionally, those with limited literacy or cognitive disabilities
may have difficulty understanding and following complex
directions. Accordingly, admission criteria may lead to reduced
access to care and worse health outcomes, while compounding
existing disparities.33 Concrete evidence of this problem can be
seen in readmission statistics, which consistently show that

33. In a study that sought to understand why patients living in poverty had
worse outcomes after discharge than patients who had greater financial means, one
patient explained, “I knew I couldn’t do the things they were asking me to do. So, I
just sort of gave up. I knew I would end up back in the hospital.” Susannah M.
Bernhein & Joseph S. Ross, Hospital Discharge and the Transition Home for Poor
Patients: “I Knew I Couldn’t Do What They Were Asking Me”, 29 J. GEN. INTERN.
MED. 269, 270 (2013).
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patients of lower economic status consistently have higher
readmission rates than those who have more resources.34
A focus on healthism and intersectionality reveals that a
more holistic approach to broad coverage decisions is necessary
to provide more just and effective treatment, as well as
minimizing waste.
Third-party payer decisions that seem
facially neutral, such as what severity of illness justifies
hospitalization, must consider the disparate effect of these
decisions on those who are more vulnerable. A policy is certainly
flawed when it worsens the effect of these background
conditions, and perhaps is flawed unless it ameliorates them.
For example, for those who do not have sufficient resources, the
Medicare plan could be changed to provide coverage for a
residential stay in an institution that can provide the proper
level of care.
A final example is animus and bias for those with specific
health conditions and those who have both a health condition
and a particular trait that can be the focus of bias or outright
bigotry. When making scarce resource allocations with regards
to providing health care, some people will lose based on their
health status, as the very decisions themselves concern which
health problems are addressed and by what means. These
decisions will be a challenge both when IPAB creates a package
and when Congress chooses to alter the package’s contents.
However, these decisions can be made in a way that is honest
and respectful, acknowledging trade-offs and minimizing the
effect of animus and bias.
Congressional debates regarding the opening of a package is
a particular area of concern. A debate over the allocation of
scarce resources could inspire political catering to those with
higher standing in the political system and distort the outcome
in favor of those people, while worsening existing inequalities
that led to others having lesser political power in the first place.
It should be possible to minimize injustice in such a procedure.

34. Id. at 269.
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Accordingly, defining healthism and being aware of the
pernicious effect of healthism combined with intersectionality
concerns is a significant first step. It seems, though, that more
could be done. Given that these concerns are reasonable, it
seems equally justifiable to require auditing of proposals prior to
debate so that some effort is made to identify the negative effects
of any proposal and the populations who stand to suffer from
them, as well as the beneficial effects and those who will receive
them.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some degree of healthism is possibly unavoidable in
insurance markets and government-sponsored insurance
programs. However, an awareness of healthism in its most
pernicious form, particularly when combined with other forms of
bigotry, can serve to help these programs become more just and
ethically defensible.

